Effort dynamics in a fisheries bioeconomic model: A vessel level approach through Game Theory

Authors

  • Gorka Merino Institut de Ciències del Mar, (ICM-CSIC), Barcelona
  • Francesc Maynou Institut de Ciències del Mar, (ICM-CSIC), Barcelona
  • Antonio García-Olivares Institut de Ciències del Mar, (ICM-CSIC), Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/scimar.2007.71n3537

Keywords:

effort dynamics, game theory, fisheries bioeconomics, simulation models, red shrimp, Northwestern Mediterranean

Abstract


Red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1816) is one of the most important resources for the bottom-trawl fleets in the northwestern Mediterranean, in terms of both landings and economic value. A simple bioeconomic model introducing Game Theory for the prediction of effort dynamics at vessel level is proposed. The game is performed by the twelve vessels exploiting red shrimp in Blanes. Within the game, two solutions are performed: non-cooperation and cooperation. The first is proposed as a realistic method for the prediction of individual effort strategies and the second is used to illustrate the potential profitability of the analysed fishery. The effort strategy for each vessel is the number of fishing days per year and their objective is profit maximisation, individual profits for the non-cooperative solution and total profits for the cooperative one. In the present analysis, strategic conflicts arise from the differences between vessels in technical efficiency (catchability coefficient) and economic efficiency (defined here). The ten-year and 1000-iteration stochastic simulations performed for the two effort solutions show that the best strategy from both an economic and a conservationist perspective is homogeneous effort cooperation. However, the results under non-cooperation are more similar to the observed data on effort strategies and landings.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Arnason, R. – 1998. Fisheries subsidies. Overcapitalization and economic losses, Workshop on Overcapacity, Overcapitalization and Subsidies in European Fisheries, Portsmouth.

Arnason, R., G. Magnusson and S. Agnarsson. – 1999. The Atlanto- Scandian herring fishery: Toward a stylized model. In: T.B.a.G.R. Munro (eds.), Proceedings from the conference on the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, and the UN agreement, pp. 1-21. Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen.

Bas, C. – 2006. The Mediterranean Sea: Living resources and exploitation. CIHEAM-IAMZ, FAO COPEMED, Zaragoza, Spain.

Bas, C., F. Maynou, F. Sardá and J. Lleonart. – 2003. Variacions demogràfiques a les poblacions d’espècies demersals explotades. Els darrers quaranta anys a Blanes i Barcelona. Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona.

Basar, T. and G.J. Olsder. – 1999. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. SIAM, Philadelphia.

Cade, B.S. and J.W. Terrell. – 1997. Cautions on forcing regression equations through the origin. North. Am. J. Fish. Manage., 17: 225-227.

Camerer, C.F. and E. Fehr. – 2006. When does “economic man” dominate social behaviour? Science, 311: 47-52. doi:10.1126/science.1110600 PMid:16400140

Carbonell, A., J. Bruno, M. Gaza, J.L. Fernández and P. Pereda. – 2003. Stock assessment of the red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) in the management unit 5. Balearic zone, Northern Spain. Working document nº3 to the G.F.C.M. SAC Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks.

Carbonell, A., M. Carbonell, M. Demestre, A. Grau and S. Montserrat. – 1999. The red shrimp Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1816) fishery and biology in the Balearic islands, western Mediterranean. Fish. Res., 44: 1-13. doi:10.1016/S0165-7836(99)00079-X

Carroll, D.L. – 2001. gafortran. Urbana. Genetic algorithm approach for parameter estimation.

Charbonneau, P. – 2002. An introduction to genetic algorithms for numerical optimization. National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado.

Demestre, M. and J. Lleonart. – 1993. Population dynamics of Aristeus antennatus (Decapoda: Dendrobranchiata) in the northwestern Mediterranean. Sci. Mar., 57: 183-189.

Demestre, M. and P. Martin. – 1993. Optimum exploitation of a demersal resource in the western Mediterranean: the fishery of the deep-water shrimp Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1916). Sci. Mar., 57: 175-182.

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole. – 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Grønbæk, L. – 2000. Fishery economics and Game Theory. University of Southern Denmark, Esberj.

Hannesson, R. – 1995. Sequential fishing: cooperative and noncooperative equilibria. Nat. Res. Model., 9: 51-59.

Hannesson, R. – 1997. Fishing as a Supergame. J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 32: 309-322. doi:10.1006/jeem.1997.0971

Hardin, G. – 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162: 1243-1248. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243 PMid:AMBIGUOUS 17756331,9563937,5699198

Hauge, K.H. – 2005. A framework for making qualities of indicators transparent. ICES J. Mar. Sci., 62(3):552-557. doi:10.1016/j.icesjms.2004.12.014

Hilborn, R. and C.J. Walters. – 1992. Quantitative fisheries stock assessment: Choice, dynamics and uncertainty. Chapman and Hall, London.

Irazola, M., A. Lucchetti, J. Lleonart, A. Ocaña, J.M. Tapia and S. Tudela. – 1996. La Pesca en el siglo XXI. Propuestas para una gestión pesquera en Catalunya. CC. OO. Federación del transporte, Barcelona.

Lindebo, E. – 1999. Capacity indicators of the European fishing fleet: Analytical approaches and data aggregation. EAFE 2003 Proc. 15th Ann. Conf. Eur. Association Fish., Economists, Ifremer, Brest, France. 37: 8.

Lleonart, J. and F. Maynou. – 2003. Fish stock assessments in the Mediterranean: state of the art. Sci. Mar., 67: 37-49.

Lleonart, J., F. Maynou, L. Recasens and R. Franquesa. – 2003. A bioeconomic model for Mediterranean fisheries, the hake off Catalonia (western Mediterranean) as a case study. Sci. Mar., 67: 337-351.

Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa. – 1989. Games and decisions. Introduction and critical survey. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York.

Maynou, F., F. Sardá, S. Tudela and M. Demestre. – 2006. Management strategies for red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) fisheries in the Catalan sea (NW Mediterranean) based on bioeconomic simulation models. Aquat. Living Resour., 19: 161-171. doi:10.1051/alr:2006014

Merino, G. – 2006. Simulation techniques for the bioeconomic analysis of Mediterranean fisheries. Game Theory and effort dynamics. GAMEFISTO model. Ph.D. thesis, Univ. Politécnica de Catalunya.

Mesterton-Gibbons, M. – 1993. Game-Theoretic resource modeling. Nat. Res. Model., 7(2): 93-147.

Munro, G.R. – 1979. The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources. Can. J. Econ., 12: 355-376. doi:10.2307/134727

Munro, G.R. – 1990. The optimal management of transboundary fisheries: game theoretic considerations. Nat. Res. Model., 4: 403-426.

Nash, J.F. – 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18: 155-162. doi:10.2307/1907266

Nash, J.F. – 1951. Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math., 54: 286-295. Oakerson, R.J. – 1992. Analyzing the commons: A framework. In: D.W. Bromley (eds.), Making the commons work: Theory, practice and policy, pp. 41-59. ICS Press, San Franciso, California.

Sardá, F. – 2000. Analysis of the Mediterranean (including North Africa) deep-sea shrimp fishery: evolution, catches, effort and economics. DG XIV/97/0018. Final report.

Sardá, F., J.B. Company and F. Maynou. – 2003. Deep-sea Shrimp Aristeus antennatus Risso 1816 in the Catalan Sea, a review and perspectives. J. Northwest. Atl. Fish. Soc., 31: 127-136.

Schaefer, M.B. – 1954. Some aspects of the dynamics of populations important to the management of commercial marine fisheries. Bull. I-ATTC., 1: 27-56.

Shor, M. – accessed 2006. “Cooperative Game”, Dictionary of Game Theoretic Terms, Game Theory.net, http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/CooperativeGame.html.

Sparre, P.J. and R. Willman. – 1993a. Software for bio-economic analysis of fisheries. BEAM 4. Analytical Bio-economic Simulation of Space-structured Multispecies and Multi-fleet Fisheries. Vol. 1. Description of the model. Computerized information series (Fisheries). FAO, 186.

Sparre, P.J. and R. Willman. – 1993b. Software for bio-economic analysis of fisheries. BEAM 4. Analytical Bio-economic Simulation of Space-structured Multispecies and Multi-fleet Fisheries. Vol. 2. User’s manual. Computerized information series (Fisheries). FAO, 46.

Sumaila, U.R. – 1997. Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock. Environ. Resour. Econ., 10: 147-165. doi:10.1023/A:1026459309123

Sumaila, U.R. – 1999. A review of game theoretic models of fishing. Mar. Policy, 23: 1-10. doi:10.1016/S0308-597X(97)00045-6

Downloads

Published

2007-09-30

How to Cite

1.
Merino G, Maynou F, García-Olivares A. Effort dynamics in a fisheries bioeconomic model: A vessel level approach through Game Theory. scimar [Internet]. 2007Sep.30 [cited 2022Oct.7];71(3):537-50. Available from: https://scientiamarina.revistas.csic.es/index.php/scientiamarina/article/view/58

Issue

Section

Articles

Most read articles by the same author(s)

1 2 3 4 > >>